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A decision maker must divide a prize between multiple agents. The prize may
be divisible (e.g., a budget, pork-barrel spending) in which case he prefers to award
larger shares of the prize to relatively more-qualiﬁed agents, or it may be non-divisible
(e.g., jobs, college admissions) in which case he prefers to award the limited number
of prizes to the most-qualiﬁed agents. He is, however, ex ante uncertain about agent
qualiﬁcations. Agents may directly reveal veriﬁable evidence about their qualiﬁcations
to the decision maker only if the decision maker grants them “access” (e.g., he takes
time to review their applications, hold interviews, or conduct an investigation). The
time-constrained decision maker must decide which agents receive access, as he cannot
grant access to everyone.
One way to award access is through a competition, where agents submit payments
(e.g., time, money) and higher payments correspond to a greater likelihood of receiv-
ing access. The analysis shows that there always exists competition for access mecha-
nisms in which the decision maker becomes fully informed about the qualiﬁcations of
all agents (even though only some agents reveal their qualiﬁcations through access).
That is, the decision maker can award access in such a way that he always becomes
fully informed and chooses his preferred prize allocation. The paper derives such full-
revelation mechanisms, and determines when awarding access through a traditional
all-pay auction is suﬃcient for full revelation. (JEL D44, D78, D82)
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11 Introduction
An administrator must decide how to allocate a budget across diﬀerent departments or
projects. A politician must decide which initiatives to devote time and energy, or which
projects in his district to direct pork spending. An employer must decide which applicants
to hire. A university must decide whom to grant admission or award scholarships. Each
of these examples can be modeled as a game in which a decision maker is responsible for
allocating a limited resource across multiple potential recipients. In the ﬁrst two examples
(and in the ﬁrst part of the paper), the decision maker must split a divisible resource across
multiple agents. In the second two examples (and in the later part of the paper), the decision
maker must decide which agents receive a limited number of non-divisible prizes.
In each of the examples, the decision maker’s ideal allocation likely depends on the
merits of the potential recipients, although he may be uncertain about these merits. To
learn about his ideal allocation, the decision maker may review applications, hold interviews,
call references, or otherwise conduct an investigation. Due to the cost of these activities,
however, he may not be able to directly learn the qualiﬁcations of all agents. To get noticed
and increase the odds of the decision maker taking a closer look at their qualiﬁcations, agents
may make monetary payments or undertake costly actions observed by the decision maker.1
This paper considers an allocation game in which individual agents either vie for a larger
share of the total, or for one of a limited number of prizes. Agents have veriﬁable evidence
regarding their own qualiﬁcations (e.g., their ability to use ﬁnancing eﬀectively, their skill
level, their past achievements, their project’s support amongst a politician’s constituents),
which they can disclose to the decision maker only if he grants them “access.” The deci-
sion maker is time constrained and cannot grant access to all agents before he chooses an
allocation.
Unlike other models of veriﬁable information disclosure, the decision maker determines
which agents receive access. The analysis considers whether the way in which the decision
maker awards access impacts his ability to learn and choose his preferred allocation. In
doing so, we focus on a class of mechanisms in which the decision maker auctions oﬀ access
to the agents. In these competition for access mechanisms, agents bid by providing payments
(e.g., campaign contributions, eﬀort) that are observed by the decision maker (e.g., politician,
employer), where submitting a higher bid increases the expected likelihood of gaining access.
1Monetary payments may include political contributions or bribes. Costly actions may include putting
extra eﬀort into the development of application materials (e.g., writing a personalized cover letter, then
printing it on high-quality paper), buying an expensive interview suit, spending extra hours in the oﬃce
leading up to the award of bonuses, asking well-known colleagues to call on one’s behalf, hounding a decision
maker with phone calls and emails, or otherwise kissing up.
2Remarkably, the analysis shows that there always exists mechanisms for awarding access
under which the decision maker becomes fully informed. That is, the decision maker can
award access in such a way that he always learns the evidence of all agents, even though he
only gives access to some of the agents.
When agents only diﬀer in terms of their qualiﬁcations, simply awarding access to the
highest bidders results in full revelation. However, when agents diﬀer in terms of their
wealth, valuations, or other factors, it is no longer suﬃcient to award access to the highest
bidders. Instead, full revelation requires that the auction mechanism adjust the bids to
account for agent heterogeneity before awarding access. An auction mechanism that fully
adjusts agent bids to account for heterogeneity (such that in equilibrium agents with the
highest qualiﬁcations always win access) is a full revelation mechanism.2
In equilibrium, under a full revelation access mechanism, agents provide payments or
bids according to strictly increasing bid functions. This means that for each agent there
exists a one-to-one mapping between the agent’s qualiﬁcations and its bid. The rational
decision maker, upon observing an agent’s payment, can correctly infer the agent’s qual-
iﬁcations, even if the agent does not receive access. This means that in equilibrium the
decision maker becomes fully informed about the qualiﬁcations of all agents, even though
not all agents receive access. Access still plays an important role in determining equilibrium
strategies, however, as it provides the needed disincentive to prevent agents from overbidding
in an attempt to exaggerate their true qualiﬁcations. Without some amount of access in the
model, there is a pooling equilibrium in which agent payments do not correspond to their
qualiﬁcations. In the access mechanisms considered in this paper, an agent that increases
its payment both signals higher qualiﬁcations, and increases the probability it wins access.
When an agent wins access, it reveals its true qualiﬁcations and any money spent to exag-
gerate its qualiﬁcations is waisted. In equilibrium, the expected beneﬁt of increasing one’s
bid to exaggerate qualiﬁcations is fully oﬀset by the increased payment.
The paper begins with a model in which the decision maker must split a perfectly divisible
prize between multiple agents. In this setting, it is natural to think of the decision maker as a
politician, the agents as special interest groups, and their payments as political contributions
or in-kind payments such as providing canvasing or advertisements during a campaign. The
analysis suggests that providing access to special interests based on contributions (rather
than randomly or based on some other factor) may result in a better-informed politician
who more eﬀectively allocates her time and eﬀort across projects.3 This result provides an
2Such a mechanism is not the unique full-revelation mechanism. This is considered in Section 4.3.
3There is substantial evidence that political contributions do inﬂuence a group’s ability to gain access. See
for example the empirical analyses by Langbein (1986), Ansolabehere et al. (2002), and Hall and Wayman
(1990), as well as the surveys by Herndon (1982) and Makinson (2003).
3example of how political contributions may play a positive role in the political process, and is
largely in contrast to models of inﬂuence in which politicians sell policies rather than access
(e.g., Grossman and Helpman 1994, Coate 2004a).4
The model assumes that agents have veriﬁable evidence regarding their qualiﬁcations.5
This means, for example, that job applicants can provide information about their background
and experience. Similarly, interest groups can provide information about the importance of
their issues or proposed projects for a politician’s constituents. To our knowledge, only
two other papers, Austen-Smith (1998) and Cotton (2009), require one to gain access before
presenting veriﬁable information.6 Austen-Smith (1998) assumes that a decision maker sets a
price for access, then awards an agent access if the agent pays the announced price. Although
such a method for awarding access may increase the decision maker’s information (i.e., he
knows that any agent that doesn’t pay for access must have low-enough quality evidence),
it is not a full revelation mechanism as the decision maker remains less than fully informed
about the qualiﬁcations of agents that do not buy access. Cotton (2009) presents a stylized
model in which politicians can sell either policy favors or access through an all-pay auction
with two agents and a one-dimensional policy space. Given the symmetry of the interest
groups in that game, the all-pay auction for access is a full revelation mechanism. The
present paper considers full revelation mechanisms in a general framework.
Although other papers consider the incentives agents have to disclose private information
to a decision maker, these papers almost uniformly ignore the need to gain access to the
decision maker, and the possibility that access is limited. It matters whether access is limited.
Milgrom and Roberts (1986), Seidmann and Winter (1997), and Ben-Porath and Lipman
(2009) establish conditions under which agents will disclose private information.7 But, if the
4See also the policy-for-sale models by Grossman and Helpman (1996), and Prat (2002a,b). In such
policy-for-sale models, politicians typically know which course of auction is best for their constituents, but
choose to do something else in order to attract political contributions. Others including Bennedsen and
Feldmann (2006) and Dahm and Porteiro (2008a,b) allow interest groups to inﬂuence policy through both
the disclosure of evidence and the explicit exchange of contributions for favors. These papers do not consider
limited access, and contributions are only provided in exchange for favors. We are not the ﬁrst to suggest
that political contributions may play a beneﬁcial role. In Coate (2004b), for example, contributions fund
informative advertising, which improves voter ability to choose the most qualiﬁed candidate.
5This is distinct from games of non-veriﬁable information, e.g., Crawford and Sobel (1982), Austen-Smith
(1994).
6Levy and Razin (2009) consider a game in which interest groups compete to put items on a politician’s
agenda. Although their model does not include veriﬁable information disclosure, it does incorporate a similar
notion of access as our paper.
7Ben-Porath and Lipman (2009) show that a decision maker can use a threat of taxes and transfers to
make agents fully reveal their evidence in equilibrium. In their setting, in contrast to the current paper, the
decision maker can listen to everyone, and he has the power to tax the agents. In our paper, the decision
maker cannot listen to everyone, and any payments made by the agents are made voluntarily. See also Green
and Laﬀont (1986), Lipman and Seppi (1995), and Bull and Watson (2004, 2007).
4decision maker doesn’t have time to meet with all of the agents (i.e., limited access), then he
will not become fully informed, even if all agents are willing to share their information. An
employer, for example, only has time to interview some applicants, even though all applicants
may be willing to come in for an interview. Where other papers consider when agents with
access disclose evidence, we ask what the decision maker can learn about the evidence of
those without access. In particular, we show that the decision maker can always award a
limited amount of access in such a way that he becomes fully informed about the evidence
of everyone, even those without access.
Competition for access in this paper is a variation of a “handicap” all-pay auction.8 In a
handicap auction, the auction mechanism favors certain bidders who may not have to bid as
much as others to win a prize (e.g., Feess et al. 2008). For example, a handicap auction may
inﬂate the bids of poor agents to allow them to better compete against rich agents.9 Eso and
Szentes (2007) show that an auctioneer can use a handicap auction to maximize revenue in
a game in which he can reveal information to the bidders about the value of the item.10 The
present paper assumes that bidders reveal information to the auctioneer (not the other way
around), and the auctioneer’s goal is to collect as much information as possible (rather than
revenue maximization). We show how a handicap auction can also be used to maximize the
revelation of information, not only revenue.
Section 2 describes the model for the case of a divisible prize, and walks through prelim-
inary results that allow the remainder of the analysis to focus on the access game. Section 3
considers the access game in detail, and presents the main result of the paper. We show that
a decision maker can always award access in such a way that he becomes fully informed about
the qualiﬁcations of all agents, and we describe such a mechanism. Section 4 discusses the
main result, including how access drives the result. Section 4.2 shows that a standard all pay
auction is a full revelation mechanism when agents diﬀer only in terms of their qualiﬁcations
(a special case of the general game). Section 4.3 shows that the full revelation mechanism
found earlier is not unique, and provides a more-general result describing a larger class of
full revelation mechanisms. Section 5 shows that the results continue to hold when prizes
are non-divisible. Section 6 concludes the paper.
8For models of the all pay auction, see Baye et al. (1993) and Che and Gale (1998).
9Think of a “head start” in a foot race, or a golf handicap, which allows golfers of diﬀerent ability to
compete on more equal terms.




An individual decision maker is responsible for splitting a prize between N independent
agents. Denote an arbitrary agent by i, and a vector of all other agents besides i by the sub-
script −i. The total size of the prize equals 1, and the share assigned to agent i = {1,...,N}
equals pi, where p =( p1,...,pN) and
￿N
i=1 pi ≤ 1. (Section 5 allows for non-divisible prizes.)
Agents diﬀer in terms of their qualiﬁcations, where qi denotes the qualiﬁcations of agent
i, and q =( q1,...,qN). When the decision maker knows q, he can choose an allocation to
maximize his payoﬀ (these payoﬀs will be described below). However, he is ex ante uncertain
about agent qualiﬁcations, and is therefore less than fully informed about q.
Before choosing an allocation p, the decision maker can grant access, giving agents the
ability to veriﬁably communicate their own qi. Due to time constraints, however, the decision
maker is unable to award access to all agents. Formally, the politician may provide access
to no more than K agents, where K ∈{ 1,...,N −1}. This paper is concerned with whether
the decision maker’s choice of how to award access aﬀects his information and his ability to
choose his preferred policy.11 In particular, the analysis is concerned with a speciﬁc type
of mechanism in which agents make payments (e.g., money, eﬀort, time commitments) in
competition for access.L e tti ≥ 0 denote any payment made by agent i, where t =( t1,...,tN)
is observed by the decision maker.
Preferred Allocation and Payoﬀs–The decision maker earns utility W(p;q)f r o m










All else equal, the decision maker prefers to award larger shares of the prize to more-qualiﬁed
11This is equivalent to a setting in which the decision maker has access to some veriﬁcation service which
reveals q. This veriﬁcation service may be scarce, so he cannot verify all N qualiﬁcations. How does he
decide which agent’s qualiﬁcations to verify?
12The analysis assumes that the decision maker cares only about the allocation, and not about payments
received from the agents. When this is the case, the main result in the paper, that the decision maker can
award access in a way that he always becomes fully informed, makes the most sense because awarding access
in such a way maximizes his utility. If the decision maker also cares about payments, there continues to
exist a full revelation access mechanism. The decision maker can award access in a way that he becomes
fully informed; however, he may not care to use such a mechanism, as he is not longer only concerned
with allocation utility. He prefers the mechanism that optimally trades oﬀ expected allocation utility and
payments.
6agents. That is, W is such that
∂p∗
i
∂qi > 0 and
∂p∗
i
∂qj < 0 for all j ￿= i and any possible q.
Furthermore, the analysis assumes that p∗
i(q) > 0 for all i and any possible q; this condition
simpliﬁes the analysis, but is not required for the main results of the paper to hold.13 When
the decision maker knows q, he sets p = p∗. However, he is ex ante uncertain about q, and
is therefore uncertain about the identity of p∗.
Agents strictly prefer receiving higher allocations, and they ﬁnd payments in competition
for access costly. Therefore, agent i earns utility
Ui(pi,t i)=Vi(pi) − citi,
where Vi is twice continuously diﬀerentiable, V ￿
i (pi) > 0, and ci > 0. An agent’s utility does
not directly depend on the payments made or allocation received by others. Furthermore,
Vi is independent of qi. By keeping agent valuations independent of their qualiﬁcations, the
model is able to highlight how qualiﬁcations alone impact one’s willingness to contribute. An
agent’s utility is linear in its payment ti; assuming linearity allows for a closed-form solution
for the equilibrium payment function.14 The functions Ui are common knowledge.15
Qualiﬁcations and Evidence–The state of the world is given by vector q. Before the
game, each agent observes its own qi, but not the qualiﬁcations of the other agents. The
decision maker does not observe q. Each agent’s qi is the independent realization of a random
variable continuously distributed on R+ according to distribution function Fi and density
function fi. The distributions are common knowledge.
Although the decision maker does not observe q ex ante, he can provide agents access
before he chooses p. An agent with access can provide veriﬁable evidence to the decision
maker regarding their own qualiﬁcations. Formally, the evidentiary structure meets the
requirements of Lipman and Seppi (1995)’s full reports condition and Bull and Watson
(2007)’s evidentiary normality condition, which require that higher-type agents can always
provide evidence not available to lower-type agents. An agent can underrepresent but not





= ∞. Various forms of W meet the requirements
described in the paper, including W(p;q)=
￿N





14Alternatively, −citi may be replaced by a function C :R + → R. So long as C is strictly decreasing in ti,
agent equilibrium payment functions are strictly increasing in qi. Therefore, the main result of the analysis
holds and the decision maker learns the qualiﬁcations of all agents even when he only grants access to some
of the agents.
15Most auction models assume that valuations or costs are unknown. This paper makes the alternative
assumption that Vi and ci are known, but that agents have private information about their own qualiﬁcations.
This is consistent with an example in which a politician knows whether an interest group (e.g., the NRA or
the Village of Fremont Community Center) is rich or poor and he knows how desirable the group would ﬁnd
a change in policy or increased funding, but the politician doesn’t know whether the interest group can make
a strong argument that the change in policy or increase in funding will beneﬁt the politician’s constituents
as a whole.
7exaggerate its evidence. If agent i has access to the decision maker, he can present any
evidence amount ei ∈ [0,q i], or he can refuse to present any evidence in which case ei = ∅.
Let ω = {ei}∀i￿ai=1 denote the vector of evidence revealed by those with access.
Game Order–Given the access mechanism Γ, the agents and the decision maker par-
ticipate in a one-shot game that takes place in the following order:
1. The decision maker awards access to up to K agents. (Section 3 considers this stage
of the game in detail.)
2. Each of the agents that receive access simultaneously chooses evidence ei to reveal.
3. The decision maker chooses allocation p.
States and Beliefs–The realized state of the world is deﬁned by the vector of realized
qualiﬁcations q.L e tS =R N
+ denote the state space, and ˆ q ∈ S denote an arbitrary state in
S. The function µ(·|t,ω) deﬁnes the decision maker’s beliefs about the state of the world
given payment vector t and the vector of evidence revealed through access ω. These beliefs






µ(ˆ q | t,ω)=
￿
i
ˆ fi (ˆ qi | t,ω).
Solution Concept–The analysis considers the pure-strategy Perfect Bayesian Equilib-
rium of the game. A formal description of the equilibrium must include strategy proﬁles for
the decision maker and agents, as well as the decision maker’s beliefs about the state of the
world at the time he chooses p. The beliefs µ must be consistent with using Bayes’ Rule on
the ex ante distribution of evidence quality given the interest group strategies. Each player’s
strategy must be a best response to the strategies of the other players, given the player’s
beliefs.16
The analysis, however, is primarily concerned with the stage of the game in which the
decision maker awards access. Therefore, when we formalize the equilibrium concept in
Section 3, we treat the strategies and belief functions of the players at the later stages of
the game (i.e., at the point of evidence disclosure and allocation decision) as ﬁxed. This in
no way weakens the analysis since, as Section 2.2 shows, the equilibrium strategies in these
later stages are independent of the way in which the decision maker awards access.
2.2 Preliminary Analysis
The main focus of this paper is on the competition between agents for access to the decision
maker. To better focus on the access mechanism, it is helpful to ﬁrst consider the agents’
16For a detailed description of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium belief requirements, see Fudenberg and Tirole
(1991).
8evidence revelation decision, and the decision maker’s allocation decision and beliefs, before
the paper analyzes the competition for access.
Allocation Choice–The decision maker chooses an allocation in the ﬁnal stage of the
game before payoﬀs are realized. The decision maker chooses p to maximize EµW(p,q)=
￿
ˆ q∈S µ(ˆ q | t,ω)W(p, ˆ q)dˆ q, where the operator Eµ represents the decision maker’s expectations
given his beliefs µ at the time he chooses allocation p.
Given that the decision maker’s payoﬀs do not directly depend on t or ω, the contributions
and revealed evidence can only inﬂuence p by inﬂuencing the decision maker’s beliefs µ.I f
the decision maker’s beliefs place probability 1 on the true state of the world q, then he will
choose the optimal allocation, p∗.
Agent Evidence Revelation and Principal Beliefs–Any agent with access reveals
all of its evidence, ei = qi. This is a standard result in the hard evidence literature (e.g.,
Milgrom 1981, Bull and Watson 2004). If agents with access revealed ei <q i, then an agent
could costlessly represent higher qualiﬁcations by revealing ei = qi instead. Only when each
i reveals ei = qi do no agents have an incentive to deviate. Similarly, no agent with qi > 0
will ever refuse to reveal evidence. If ei = ∅, the decision maker updates his beliefs and puts
probability 1 on qi = 0; thus ˆ fi(0 |∅= ei ∈ ω)=1 . 17
In equilibrium, any agent i with access announces ei = qi. Therefore, when agent i reveals
evidence ei to the decision maker, the decision maker’s beliefs µ must put probability 1 on
qi = ei and probability 0 on any state in which qi ￿= ei. Thus, ˆ fi(ei | ei ∈ ω)=1 .
3 The Access Game
The decision maker decides which agents receive access. The primary contribution of this
paper is to establish that the decision maker can always award a limited amount of access in
such a way that he becomes fully informed about the qualiﬁcations of all agents, even those
who do not receive access.
The analysis focuses on a speciﬁc class of mechanisms for awarding access in which agents
provide payments in competition for access. The decision maker assigns access according to a
predeﬁned competition for access mechanism Γ = {k,θ}, which deﬁnes the number of agents
to be awarded access k ∈{ 0,1,...,K}, and a vector of functions θ = {θ1,...,θN}. Function
17If instead the decision maker’s beliefs were such that Eµqi > 0w h e nei = ∅, then all agents with
qi ≤ Eµqi (and no agents with qi >E µqi) have an incentive to announce ei = ∅. The decision maker
recognizes this and his beliefs therefore must account for the types of agents that do announce ei = ∅,w h i c h
requires him to lower Eµqi. Again however, only agents with actual qualiﬁcations lower than the updated
expected qualiﬁcations refuse to reveal evidence. The reasoning repeats, and Eµ(qi | ei = ∅) → 0; only then
do no agents have an incentive to deviate. See Milgrom (1981) for a formal proof.
9θi :R + → R+ maps agent i’s payment ti onto the real line. θi is a strictly-increasing,
continuous function in ti, where θi(0) = 0 for each i. Agent i receives access if fewer than k
other agents have θj(tj) greater than θi(ti). Tied agents receive access with equal probability.
When θi(ti)=ti for each i, access is awarded through a standard all-pay auction with the
k highest bidders winning access. A more general function θi allows the access decision to
take into account individual agent characteristics, including diﬀerences in Vi, Fi, ci, and p∗
i.18
The analysis considers a framework in which all agents pay their ti, regardless of whether
they win access.
In competition for access, agents simultaneously choose payments (e.g., money, eﬀort),
and the k agents with the highest θi(ti) receive access. Let Ti :R + → R+ denote a payment
strategy for agent i, where Ti(qi) is its payment when it has qualiﬁcations qi. The vector
of payment strategies for all agents T = {T1,...,TN} constitutes an “access equilibrium” of
the game if no agent has an incentive to deviate from Ti given access mechanism Γ and the
strategies of the other agents. This is formalized in the following deﬁnition, where Pi(t)
denotes the decision maker’s equilibrium choice of pi given the payments.
Deﬁnition 1 Payment strategies T = {T1,...,TN} constitute an access equilibrium under





πi(ˆ q−i)Ui (Pi(ti,{Tj(ˆ qj)}∀j￿=i),t i)dˆ q−i,
where πi(ˆ q−i) ≡
￿
j￿=i fj(ˆ qj).
This deﬁnes the equilibrium of the competition for access taking as given the strategies
and beliefs during the later stages of the game, as described in section 2.2.
3.1 Full Revelation Mechanisms
This section formalizes the concept of a full revelation mechanism, under which in equilibrium
the decision maker becomes fully informed about the evidence of all agents, even though he
can only give access to some of the agents. It then provides a suﬃcient condition for the
equilibrium payment strategies in a competition for access game to result in full revelation
of information.
Deﬁnition 2 The decision maker is said to be fully informed if in equilibrium, his beliefs
put probability 1 on the true state of the world at the time he chooses an allocation p.
18That is, the paper allows for a “handicap auction” mechanism in which all payers’ bids may not be
treated equally. See for example Feess et al. (2008) and Eso and Szentes (2007).
10Deﬁnition 3 Mechanism Γ is said to be a full revelation mechanism if under Γ there
exists an access equilibrium in which the decision maker is always fully informed.
As section 2.2 shows, a fully informed decision maker always implements his ﬁrst best
allocation p∗. Therefore, a full revelation mechanism results in the decision maker’s preferred
allocation in equilibrium.
3.2 Main Result
The main result establishes that there always exists a competition for access mechanism
that results in a fully informed decision maker. The analysis holds for any k ∈{ 1,...,K};
therefore, such a full revelation mechanism exists even when the decision maker can give
access to a very small number of agents, including K =1 .
Proposition 1 For each k ∈{ 1,...,K}, there always exists a competition for access mech-
anism ˆ Γ={k, ˆ θ} with access equilibrium ˆ T = {ˆ T1,..., ˆ TN}, where for each agent, ˆ Ti(qi)=
ˆ θ
−1
i (ti). Such a mechanism is a full revelation mechanism.
In addition to establishing that a full revelation mechanism always exists, the proposition
also establishes that in equilibrium, ˆ Ti(qi)=ˆ θ
−1
i (ti). Letting ˆ Qi(ti) ≡ ˆ T
−1
i (qi), this condition
means ˆ θi = ˆ Qi.19 That is, the k agents who’s payments signal the highest qualiﬁcations
receive access, and in equilibrium, access goes to the most qualiﬁed agents. This does
not mean that the most qualiﬁed agents necessarily submit the highest payments to the
decision maker in the competition for access game. Rather, it means that allocation of
access takes into account diﬀerences in agent characteristics (e.g., valuation, wealth, evidence
distribution) such that when bidding for access no agent is at an advantage or disadvantage
compared to other agents with similar qualiﬁcations.
The proof to Proposition 1 in the appendix derives ˆ θ and ˆ T. In the following equation
for ˆ T, the function Ωik(qi,q −i) = 1 if fewer than k other agents have qualiﬁcations greater














i (y, ˆ q−i)) ×
∂p∗
i (y, ˆ q−i)
∂qi
￿
dˆ q−idy.( 1 )
For each i, ˆ θi(ti)=ˆ T
−1
i (qi). Note that ˆ Ti is invertible since it is strictly increasing in qi. The














i (qi, ˆ q−i)) ×
∂p∗
i (qi, ˆ q−i)
∂qi
￿
dˆ q−i,( 2 )
19In other words, ˆ Qi(ti) is the qualiﬁcations of agent i if he gives ti in equilibrium.
11which is strictly positive.20 If agent i receives access under ˆ Γ, the decision maker observes
qi directly. If i does not receive access, the decision maker believes that qi = ˆ Qi(ti), as is
consistent with the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of the game.
4 Discussion of Main Result
In equilibrium, independent of other heterogeneity, the k agents with the highest qualiﬁca-
tions receive access and the decision maker chooses his fully informed allocation. Since a
relatively rich agent (e.g., one with a low ci) ﬁnds any payment less costly, its equilibrium
payment function is steeper than an otherwise similar poor agent. In equilibrium, a rich
agent contributes more than an otherwise similar poor agent with the same qualiﬁcations,
but the rich agent is not more likely to receive access since the access mechanism accounts
for its higher ability to pay. Similarly, in equilibrium, diﬀerences in agent valuations (i.e.,
Vi), qualiﬁcation distributions (i.e., Fi), or politician biases (i.e., p∗
i) do not give agents an
advantage or disadvantage when trying to secure access, as ˆ Γ accounts for this heterogeneity.
4.1 Importance of Access
An agent can “exaggerate” its qualiﬁcations by paying ti > ˆ Ti(qi). However, doing so also
increases the probability that the agent receives access and its true qualiﬁcations are discov-
ered directly. In equilibrium, the slope of an agent’s payment function must be steep enough
such that any expected beneﬁt from exaggerating its evidence is oﬀset by the monetary costs
of doing so. At the same time, the slope must be moderate enough that the agent doesn’t
want to pay less than its equilibrium payment. This implies Eq. 2, which is formally derived
in proof to Proposition 1 in the appendix.
The main result requires that the decision maker award access to at least one agent; that
is, it only holds for k ∈{ 1,...,K}. It is the possibility of winning access that keeps an agent
from paying more than ˆ Ti(qi). Without this disincentive to overpay the strict monotonicity
of the equilibrium payment functions breaks down.
4.2 Homogeneous Agents
Section 3 solves for a full revelation mechanism for a model with potentially heterogeneous
agents. This section considers the special case in which agents are completely homogeneous,
20It must be the case that Ωik = 0 for some agents and Ωik = 1 for others. This is guaranteed by
k ∈{ 1,...,K}.
12only diﬀering in terms of their qualiﬁcations. In this game, ci, Vi, p∗
i, and Fi are identical
for all agents.
When agents are homogeneous, the full revelation mechanism described in Proposition
1 simpliﬁes to a standard all-pay auction in which the agents that submit the highest pay-
ments receive access. Therefore, the decision maker becomes fully informed about agent
qualiﬁcations if he awards access through a standard all-pay auction in which the k highest
bidders receive access (i.e., an all-pay auction without handicaps).
Proposition 2 In the game with homogeneous agents, f or each k ∈{ 1,...,K}, award-
ing access to the k agents that provide the highest payments in a standard all-pay auction
constitutes a full revelation mechanism.
4.3 Non-Uniqueness and a More General Result
Section 3.2 describes a speciﬁc competition for access mechanism that always results in
full revelation of agent qualiﬁcations. Although the described full revelation mechanism is
intuitively appealing (e.g., it always awards access to the most qualiﬁed agents), it is not
unique.
Lemma 3 provides a suﬃcient condition for a mechanism to be a full revelation mecha-
nism.
Lemma 3 Suppose the decision maker awards access through Γ. If there exists an access
equilibrium such that for each i the equilibrium payment function Ti is strictly increasing in
qi for all qi ∈ R+, then Γ is a full-revelation mechanism.
When all agents make payments according to strictly increasing functions, there exists a
one-to-one mapping between each agent’s qualiﬁcations and its payment. Therefore, the
rational decision maker can correctly infer an agent’s qualiﬁcations whenever he observes
the agent’s payment.
The equilibrium payment functions in Section 3.2 meet this requirement, but they are
not the only set of functions that does so. Proposition 4 provides a more general result.
Proposition 4 Let Z denote any vector of functions {Z1,...,ZN} where for each i, Zi :
R+ → R+, Zi(0) = 0, Z￿
i(x) > 0 for all x ∈ R+, and there exists at least k other j ￿= i such
that limx→∞ Zi(x) ≥ limx→∞ Zj(x). Then, there exists a competition for access mechanism
˜ Γ={k, ˜ θ} with access equilibrium ˜ T = {˜ T1,..., ˜ TN} such that for each i and all qi ∈ R+,
˜ θi(˜ Ti(qi)) = Zi(qi), and mechanism ˜ Γ is a full revelation mechanism.
13The function Zi describes the relationship between agent i’s qualiﬁcations and the prob-
ability that it receives access in equilibrium. The conditions imposed on Z by Proposition 4
imply that an agent’s probability of receiving access is strictly increasing in its qualiﬁcations,
an agent with the lowest possible qualiﬁcations never receives access,21 and for any qi > 0
the agent wins access with probability ˜ θi(qi) ∈ (0,1). The requirement that for each agent
there must exist at least k other j ￿= i such that limx→∞ Zi(x) ≥ limx→∞ Zj(x) results in
separating equilibrium over all possible q.22
5 Non-Divisible Prizes
This section shows that the main result of the paper continues to hold when prizes are non-
divisible. Here, the decision maker must award m ∈{ 1,...,K} identical prizes to agents.
An agent may either receive one prize, or not win a prize; agents may not receive multiple
prizes or fractions of prizes. The decision maker’s utility is such that he strictly prefers to
award a prize to each of the m most-qualiﬁed agents. The concept of qualiﬁcations, their
distribution, and the evidentiary structure is unchanged from the earlier analysis. Let vi > 0
denote the value of receiving a prize to agent i, where v = {v1,...,vN} is common knowledge.
In this alternative framework, the decision maker may still award access through a full
revelation competition for access mechanism, similar to the one described by Proposition 1.
Proposition 5 When the decision maker must award m ∈{ 1,...,K} non-divisible prizes,
there always exists a competition for access mechanism ˘ Γ={k, ˘ θ} with access equilibrium
˘ T = {˘ T1,..., ˘ TN}, where k = m and for each agent, ˘ Ti(qi)=˘ θ
−1
i (ti). Such a mechanism is a
full revelation mechanism.
As in the earlier analysis, when the decision maker awards access according to a full
revelation mechanism, he becomes fully informed about the qualiﬁcations of all agents. In
equilibrium, he gives prizes to the m most-qualiﬁed agents.
The proof to Proposition 5 in the appendix derives the ˘ θ and ˘ T that satisfy Proposition
5. In the following equation for ˘ Ti, the function Φi,k(qi) denotes the ex ante probability that
fewer than k other agents have qualiﬁcations greater than qi. Given the characteristics of
the qualiﬁcation distributions F = {F1,...,FN}, the function Φi,k is strictly increasing in qi,
21Technically, an agent with the lowest qualiﬁcations may receive access if enough other agents also have
the lowest qualiﬁcations. This happens with probability 0.
22If this condition is not met for agent i, then there exists a cut point for qi such that any qi greater than
the cut point results in the agent winning access for sure, and there is pooling amongst any agent-type with






For each i, ˘ θ(ti)=˘ T
−1
i (qi). Note that ˘ Ti is invertible since it is strictly increasing in qi. The









which is strictly positive. Although the analysis behind Eq. 3 and 4 is similar to the case
when prizes are divisible, the intuition diﬀers. When prizes were divisible, the slope of the
payment function (Eq. 2) reﬂects the disincentive necessary to prevent agents from over
representing their evidence. When prizes are non-divisible, and the decision maker awards
access through the mechanism described in Proposition 5, agents would never overrepresent
their evidence. This is because in equilibrium an agent always receives access and discloses
its true qualiﬁcations before receiving a prize. Exaggerating one’s evidence increases the
agent’s payment without increasing the likelihood it receives a prize. Here the slope of ˘ Ti is
just steep enough that agents never want to underrepresent their qualiﬁcations.
6 Conclusion
The analysis shows that the way in which a decision maker allocates access can aﬀect his
information. If he awards access through a full revelation competition for access mechanism,
he becomes fully informed about the qualiﬁcations of all agents, even though he only gives
access to some of them. Such mechanisms always exist, including one in which the decision
maker awards access to the agents whose contributions signal the highest qualiﬁcations.
The analysis holds for various prize structures, including when the decision maker splits a
divisible resource (e.g., budget) between agents, and when the decision maker chooses which
agents receive one of a limited number of prizes (e.g., jobs).
This paper contributes to the literature in at least three important ways. First and
foremost, it extends the literature on veriﬁable evidence disclosure to allow for limited access.
We show that even when the decision maker cannot give access to all privately informed
agents, he can still become fully informed about agent evidence if agents compete for access.
Second, it contributes to the literature on auctions and competitions, as the competition
for access mechanisms studied in this paper are a variation of a handicap all-pay auction.
Third, the paper makes a contribution to the applied ﬁelds addressed by the model. For
example, the results provide an insight into political lobbying. They suggest that campaign
15contributions may play a beneﬁcial role in a decision making process. By observing a special
interest group’s willingness to pay for access, a politician can become better informed about
the merits of the group’s position. Similarly, the results provide insights into the labor
market where job applicants put in costly eﬀort in an eﬀort to get noticed and get invited
for an interview.
Although the framework is already quite general, there is room to make it even more
so. For example, the analysis focuses on evidentiary structures that meet the requirements
of Lipman and Seppi (1995)’s full reports condition and Bull and Watson (2007)’s eviden-
tiary normality condition, which require that higher-type agents can always provide evidence
not available to lower-type agents. This ensures that an agent can underrepresent but not
exaggerate its evidence, which is reasonable in many situations. It would be interesting,
however, to consider how the full disclosure results in this paper hold up under more gen-
eral evidentiary structures. Similarly, the model assumes that only agent qualiﬁcations are
unobserved; all other characteristics, including valuations and cost parameters, are common
knowledge. This assumption makes the analysis tractable, and may be reasonable for the
case when agents are well established special interest groups. However, it is less realistic
when agents are job applicants, for example. It would be interesting to consider how well
the results hold up when there are multiple dimensions of uncertainty. We expect that both
more general evidentiary structures and multidimensional uncertainty would mean the deci-
sion maker cannot become fully informed about agents who do not receive access, although
competition for access should still help the decision maker become better informed compared
to if he assigned access randomly or based on some ex ante observed agent characteristic. Its
less clear if the competition for access mechanisms found here would continue to be optimal
from the perspective of the decision maker. These are questions for future research.
7 Appendix
7.1 Proofs
We begin with a proof to Lemma 3, despite its location near the end of the paper. The result is
used in the proof to Proposition 1.
Proof of Lemma 3. Given that Ti is strictly monotonic, there exists a one-to-one mapping
between agent i’s qualiﬁcations qi and its contribution ti = Ti(qi). Furthermore, it implies that Ti
is invertible; let Qi(ti) ≡ T−1
i (qi). The rational decision maker, upon seeing the agent’s contribution
will correctly infer that qi = Qi(ti). This is true for all i, and in equilibrium the decision maker is
fully informed.
Proof of Proposition 1. In this proof, we walk through the derivation of the vector of strictly
16increasing functions ˆ T such that if the decision maker awards access according to mechanism ˆ Γ=
{k, ˆ θ} (where ˆ θ−1
i (ti)=ˆ Ti(qi)) then for each i, making payments according to ˆ Ti is a best response
when all other agents play according to ˆ T−i. Therefore, ˆ T constitutes an access equilibrium of
mechanism ˆ Γ. The derivation of ˆ T relies only on the initial conditions of the model, and such a ˆ T
and ˆ Γ will always exist. Furthermore, the solution for ˆ T meets the requirements of Lemma 3, and
therefore ˆ Γ is a full revelation mechanism.
Now, for the derivation of ˆ T and ˆ Γ. Let ˆ T = {ˆ T1,...,ˆ TN} denote a set of payment functions,
where for each i, the function ˆ Ti is diﬀerentiable and strictly increasing in qi. (Later, we show
that such conditions are met in equilibrium.) Since ˆ Ti is strictly increasing, it is invertible. Deﬁne
ˆ Qi ≡ ˆ T−1
i , and let ˆ Q = { ˆ Q1,..., ˆ QN}. If an agent contributes according to ˆ Ti, then the agent’s
qualiﬁcations are given by ˆ Qi(ti). Suppose that ˆ T is the access equilibrium of a competition for
access mechanism ˆ Γ={k, ˆ θ} that always awards access to the most qualiﬁed agents. Since ˆ Γ
always awards access to the agents with the highest qi, then it must be that for all i and j,
ˆ θi(ˆ Ti(qi)) > ˆ θj(ˆ Tj(qj)) if and only if qi >q j. This will be the case if, for all agents, ˆ θi(ti)= ˆ Qi(ti).
When ˆ θi(ti)= ˆ Qi(ti) for all i,t h ek agents that signal the highest qualiﬁcations receive access, and
in equilibrium these k agents with the highest signals are the most qualiﬁed agents. Below, the
analysis solves for ˆ T such that these conditions are satisﬁed.
Since ˆ T satisﬁes the requirements of Lemma 3, ˆ Γ is a full revelation mechanism. The decision
maker rationally puts probability 1 on qi = ˆ Qi(ti) when agent i does not receive access. If agent
i does receive access, the decision maker learns qi directly. Let Ωik (θi(ti);{θj(tj)}∀j￿=i) ∈{ 0,1} indi-





1 if agent i receives access in state ˆ q given i’s own payment ti.23
To derive the equilibrium payment function ˆ Ti, the analysis considers the payment of agent i
taking as given that all other agents make payments according to ˆ T. Agent i chooses ti to maximizes
his expected utility:
￿
ˆ q−i πi(ˆ q−i)
￿
Ωik( ˆ Qi(ti);{ ˆ Qj(ˆ Tj(ˆ qj))}∀j￿=i) × Vi (p∗
i (qi, ˆ q−i))
+
￿
1 − Ωik( ˆ Qi(ti);{ ˆ Qj(ˆ Tj(ˆ qj))}∀j￿=i)
￿
× Vi(p∗
i( ˆ Qi(ti), ˆ q−i))
￿
dˆ q−i − ci ti.
(5)
Since the decision maker expects that he is fully informed, he chooses policy according to p∗(q);
for each i plugging in qi = ˆ Qi(ti) when he only observes agent i’s payment (i.e., when i does not
receive access), and plugging in qi = qi when i has access. When Ωik = 1 the agent receives access,
and the decision maker awards i allocation p∗
i (qi,q −i) based on his true qualiﬁcations, as revealed
through the presented evidence. When Ωik = 0 the agent does not receive access, and the decision
maker awards i allocation p∗
i( ˆ Qi(ti),q −i) based on the equilibrium qualiﬁcations that correspond
to payment ti.
23It is straightforward, but unnecessary for the analysis to derive Ωik from the qualiﬁcation distributions
{Fj}N
j=1. We leave that exercise to the reader.
17First order conditions for the agent’s problem are given by
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ˆ q−i πi (ˆ q−i)
"“
































i (qi, ˆ q−i)
´
− Vi(p∗
i ( ˆ Qi(ti), ˆ q−i))
i#
dˆ q−i − ci =0 .
(6)
The ﬁrst row of notation in the above condition represents the marginal impact that a change in
ti has on the decision maker’s beliefs about qi and the resulting change in agent policy utility when
i does not receive access. The second row represents the marginal impact of a change in ti on on
the probability the agent wins access.
The strict monotonicity of ˆ Ti means that in equilibrium, 1/ ˆ Q￿
i(ti)=ˆ T￿
i(qi). Also in equilibrium
all agents including i contribute according to their equilibrium payment functions, therefore ˆ Qi(ti)=
qi and ˆ Qi(ˆ Ti(qi)) = qi. The ﬁrst order conditions simplify to Eq. 2 in Section 3.2. The initial
conditions regarding Vi and W imply that ˆ T￿
i(qi) > 0 for all qi ∈ R+. Integrating with respect to
qi gives the closed-form solution for the equilibrium payment function, which is given by Eq. 1.
It is possible to verify the concavity of the agents’ maximization problem, given the competition
for access mechanism ˆ Γ. To do so, plug in 1/ˆ T￿
i(qi) for the ﬁrst occurrence of ˆ Q￿
i(ti) in Eq. 6. Then
substitute in Eq. 2 for ˆ T￿




πi (ˆ q−i) ×
∂Ωik(qi;{ ˆ Qj( ˆ Tj(ˆ qj))}∀j￿=i)
∂qi








i (qi, ˆ q−i)) − Vi(p∗
i ( ˆ Qi(ti), ˆ q−i))
i
dˆ q−i.( 7 )
It should be clear that Eq. 7 is positive iﬀ Vi (p∗
i (qi, ˆ q−i))−Vi(p∗
i( ˆ Qi(ti), ˆ q−i)) > 0, which is true iﬀ
ˆ Qi(ti) <q i or equivalently ti < ˆ Ti(qi) (which includes the possible case where ti = 0). It is negative
iﬀ ti > ˆ Ti(qi). Thus, under mechanism ˆ Γ, the agent maximization problem is strictly concave, and
achieves its maximum at ti = ˆ Ti(qi).
When an agent increases his payment, doing so signals higher qualiﬁcations, but it also increases
the probability that the agent wins access (in which case, the decision maker ignores the signal and
depends instead on the evidence revealed through access). When the equilibrium condition given
by expression 2 holds, the monetary costs of “exagerating”‘ one’s evidence (i.e., signaling higher
qualiﬁcations than one actually has) is greater than the expected beneﬁt of doing so. Therefore,
an agent does not have an incentive to contribute more than ˆ Ti(qi). Similarly, he also prefers to
contribute ˆ Ti(qi) to any lower ti. This follows because agent expected utility is strictly increasing
in all ti < ˆ Ti(qi). This also rules out the possibility that an agent prefers not to participate. Not
participating is equivalent to setting ti = 0, which results in pi = 0 for sure. When each agent i’s
payment strategy ˆ Ti is given by equation 1, no agent has an incentive to deviate from playing their
respective strategy. The set of payment strategies ˆ T for all agents constitutes an access equilibrium
under competition for access mechanism ˆ Γ={k, ˆ Q}.
Proof of Proposition 2. Consider equations 1 and 2. When agents are homogeneous, the right
hand sides of both expressions are independent of an agent’s identity. (Note that if Fi is the same
for all agents, then πi and Ωik will be as well.) Therefore, the equilibrium payment functions T
18will also be identical across all agents. Since T is identical for all agents, the one-to-one mapping
between agent qualiﬁcations and payments is also the same across agents. This means that in
equilibrium agent i submits a higher payment than agent j if and only if qi >q j. Lemma 3 implies
that the all-pay auction mechanism is a full revelation mechanism in this setting.
Proof of Proposition 4. The proof to Proposition 4 follows the same method as the proof
to Proposition 1. Therefore, we do not provide as many details or discussion here as we do in
the earlier proof. Here, we assume an arbitrary vector of function Z that meet the conditions in
Proposition 1, then using the same method as in the proof to Proposition 1, we solve for ˜ θ and
˜ T.S u c h˜ θ and ˜ T may always be found (and therefore they always exist). It is straightforward to
show that for each i, ˜ Ti is strictly increasing in qi; therefore the conditions of Lemma 3 are met
and ˜ Γ={k, ˜ θ} is a full revelation mechanism.
To derive the equilibrium payment function ˜ Ti, the analysis considers the payment of agent
i taking as given that all other agents make payments according to ˜ T−i. Agent i chooses ti to
maximizes his expected utility:
￿
ˆ q−i πi(ˆ q−i)
￿
Ωik(˜ θi(ti);{Zj(ˆ qj)}∀j￿=i) × Vi (p∗
i (qi, ˆ q−i))
+
￿
1 − Ωik(˜ θi(ti);{Zj(ˆ qj)}∀j￿=i)
￿
× Vi(p∗
i( ˜ Qi(ti), ˆ q−i))
￿
dˆ q−i − ci ti.
This is a more general version of Eq. 5 in the earlier proof. First order conditions for the agent’s
problem are given by
R
ˆ q−i πi (ˆ q−i)
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i (qi, ˆ q−i)
´
− Vi(p∗
i ( ˜ Qi(ti), ˆ q−i))
i#
dˆ q−i − ci =0 .
The strict monotonicity of ˜ Ti means that in equilibrium, 1/ ˜ Q￿
i(ti)=˜ T￿
i(qi). Also in equilibrium
all agents including i contribute according to their equilibrium payment functions, therefore ˜ Qi(ti)=









(1 − Ωik(Zi(qi);{Zj(ˆ qj)}∀j￿=i)) × V ￿
i (p∗
i (qi, ˆ q−i)) ×
∂p∗




Given the conditions imposed by the proposition on Z, this expression is strictly positive. There-
fore, the requirements of Lemma 3 are met, and ˜ Γ is a full revelation mechanism. It is straightfor-










(1 − Ωik(y;ˆ q−i)) × V ￿
i (p∗
i (Zi(y),{Zj(ˆ qj)}∀j￿=i)) ×
∂p∗








Proof of Proposition 5. The proof to Proposition 5 follows the same method as the proof to
Proposition 1. Therefore, we do not provide as many details or discussion here as we do in the
earlier proof. Consider the expected payoﬀ function for agent i:
19EUi =
￿
Φi,k(qi)vi − citi if ˘ Qi(ti) ≥ qi
Φi,k( ˘ Qi(ti))vi − citi if ˘ Qi(ti) ≤ qi.
If agent i over represents its qualiﬁcations, it increases the probability it receives access, but does
not increase the probability it receives a prize. This is because when an agent receives access it
discloses its evidence, and the decision maker will award it the prize only if fewer than k other agents
disclosed or signaled higher qualiﬁcations than qi. If agent i under represents its qualiﬁcations, it
only wins access and can disclose its true qualiﬁcations if fewer than k other agents have actual
qualiﬁcations above ˘ Qi(ti). If it doesn’t win access, it will not win a prize. If it does win access, it
will win a prize (i.e., if Qi(ti) <q i is one of the k highest qualiﬁcations, so will be qi).
It should be clear from the expected payoﬀ function that an agent will never pay ti > ˘ Ti(qi).
The analysis can therefore solve for the equilibirium payment function by focusing on the case when
˘ Qi(ti) ≤ qi. First order conditions are Φ￿
i,k( ˘ Qi(ti)) ˘ Q￿
i(ti)vi − ci = 0. In equilibrium, ˘ Qi(ti)=qi,
and given the strict monotonicity of ˘ Ti, ˘ Q￿
i(ti)=1 /˘ T￿
i(qi). Therefore, the ﬁrst order conditions
may be rewritten as Eq. 4, which gives the slope of the equilibrium payment function. Inverting
Eq. 4 with respect to qi gives Eq. 3, the equilibrium payment function. Note that the slope of
the payment function is strictly increasing in qi, satisfying the requirement that for all agents, ˘ Ti
is strictly increasing in qi.
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